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on the 24th day of November, 1985, the Defendant caused the death 
of Claudette Auble and used a firearm in the commission of the 
offense. (R.p. 1) 
On the first day of April, 1986, the State of Utah, through 
its attorney, Williams F. Daines, filed a Motion in Limine, 
requesting the Court allow hearsay statements of the deceased 
into Trial. (R.p. 40) The State filed a Memorandum at the same 
time in support of Plaintiff's Motion in Limine, (R.P. 41) and on 
April 11, 1986, Defendant filed a Memorandum in Opposition to 
State1s Mot ion. (R.p. 62) 
On April 14, 1986, the Trial commenced and after selection 
of the jury, the Court, in Chambers, heard Plaintiff's Motion in 
Limine. This Motion included the use of a number of statements 
made by the deceased to various friends and other individuals, 
including: 
1. "I am leaving him type testimony"; (R.p. 220) 
2. Statements that the deceased is happy with her decision 
to leave Defendant; (R.p. 220) 
3* Statements concerning future plans; (R.p. 221) 
4. Statements concerning her then existing physical 
condition; (R.p. 222) 
5. Statements concerning her feelings towards guns; (R.p. 
222) 
6. Statements made on her feelings about suicide; (R.p. 
222) and 
7. Statements concerning the deceased believed that if she 
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A: I wasn't, I became convinced that I would do it just to 
show her. 
Q: So what did you do? 
A: I jumped toward her to try to get the gun. I said 
something about "Okay, I will". 
Q: What happened at this time? 
A: I reached to try and get ahold of the gun. It scared 
her. She fell backwards on the bed. 
Q: Then what? 
A: I got ahold of the gun. I tried to pull it away from 
her wi th one hand. 
Q: Did anything happen at that time? 
A: The gun discharged. (Tr. 1296) 
At the close of the Defendant's testimony on direct 
examination, the State renewed it's Motion to allow the 
statements (concerning if she moved out the Defendant would kill 
her), on the basis that the aforementioned testimony constituted 
a defense of self defense. (Tr. 1312) 
The Court, after taking the matter under advisement, made 
its decision as follows: 
"Generally those kinds of statements would be admissible 
if there was a defense of self defense and the defense 
that you are putting forward isn't clearly a self defense 
argument, but I think it has elements that are similar to 
self defense. Generally those statements are allowed where 
you claim self defense, because the reasoning is that the 
deceased would not be the likely aggressor if she was in 
fear of the Defendant. 
I think the same rationale applies here with your proposed 
defense and may be argued at this point, but the deceased 
would not likely be the aggressor and would not likely 
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aggressively present a gun to the Defendant tying him and 
badgering him with the gun in the way you described, if 
she was in fear of him and I wi11 allow this statement". 
(R.p. 1390-1391) 
After the defense rested, the State called as rebuttal 
witness, John Marsh, and during his testimony he testified as 
fo1 lows : 
Q: Mr. Marsh, will you explain to the jury what she (the 
deceased) told you? 
A: What she had indicated to me was that she had definitely 
decided that she was going to leave and like I testified before, 
that she believed she had picked out an apartment and everything 
and I asked her then, "Well what is going to happen?" She 
indicated to me that Jerry was really upset. That he had 
threatened before that he was going to commit suicide and this 
time he threatened that he was going to kill her. He threatened 
to kill her if she moved out. (R.p. 1442) 
On the 24th day of April, 1986, the jury deliberated for 
some five hours and came back with a verdict of guilty as 
charged. 
SIM^RY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Rule of 803(3) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provide an 
exception to the general hearsay rule in allowing into evidence 
certain hearsay statements that describe the then existing 
mental, emotional or physical condition of the declarant, for the 
limited purpose of showing the declarant's state of mind. The 
admissibility of evidence which could conceivable fall within 
Rule 803(3) must be tempered however, by several decisions from 
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the United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court, as 
well as by Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
In the present case, the State, over the objection of 
defense counsel, offered into evidence hearsay statements made by 
the deceased to John Marsh, which indicated that the deceased, 
Claudette Auble stated that if she moved out that the Defendant 
would kill her. These conversations took place a week before the 
deceased was shot and were extremely prejudicial to the defense's 
case on the basis that the jury would use those statements not 
for the purpose of determining her state of mind, a week prior to 
this incident, but rather to add substantive evidence that the 
Defendant intentionally murdered Claudette Auble, 
Furthermore, the Court allowed the statements into evidence 
in the face of U.S. v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758, (C.A.D.C. 1974), by 
reasoning that although the Defendant made no claim to a self 
defense argument, that the circumstances surrounding the shooting 
were closely enough related to a self defense type argument, 
That those statements would be admissible under U.S. v. Brown. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT COv/MITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
BY ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE HEARSAY 
STATEMENTS WMDE BY THE DECEASED 
Rule 803 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states in relevant 
part, "A statement of the Declarant's then existing state of 
mind, emotion, sensation or physical condition", is not excluded 
by the hearsay rule. 
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Although the statement by John Marsh in the present case 
could conceiveable fall within this exception 803(3) to the 
Hearsay Rule, a number of other factors would require the Judge 
to exclude this testimony from evidence. 
The guiding or limited rule of admissibility of any 
evidence, whether within the hearsay exception or not, is 
contained in Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence which states, 
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time or needless presentation of key 
mind of evidence". 
The purpose of this Rule of Evidence is to prevent the 
admission of evidence that had some relevance into the case, if 
the harm of admitting this evidence would substantially outweighs 
the probative value of this evidence. The case of 
U.S. v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758 C.A.D.C. 1974), which is the 
controlling case concerning the admissibility of hearsay in a 
situation such as the one we are presented with in the present 
case, gave a thorough analysis of the weighing requirements 
necessary in determining the admissibility of any evidence. In 
that case, the Court held 
"It is well established that some evidence, while 
bearing some logical reference to the case, may in the 
discretion of the Judge, nevertheless be excluded where 
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion or delay". 
The Court of Appeals in the Brown case then went through an 
exhaustive analysis of the weighing requirements to be used in 
analysing admissibility of a statement very similar to the 
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statement in the present case, "he said that if I left him he 
would ki11 me". (Id at 763) 
The Court stated further, that the "quantum of prejudice as 
stated above is highest when the circumstantial facts in the 
statement are intimately related to the issue to be proved". (Id 
at 766) 
In the present case, the statement in question testified to 
by John Marsh is directly related to the prosecutions entire 
premise that the Defendant killed Claudette Auble. Although the 
State purported to offer the evidence for purposes not to be used 
as proof of the matter asserted, the ability of a jury to 
properly apply this evidence, notwithstanding a jury instruction 
to the contrary, is suspect. 
As quoted in the Brown case, Justice Cordoza of the U.S. 
Supreme Court has said 
"It will not do to say that the jury might accept the 
declarations for any light that they cast upon the 
existence of a vital urge and reject them to the extent 
that they c h a r g e d the d e a t h to s o m e o n e e l s e . 
Discrimination so suttle is a feat beyond the compass 
of ordinary minds. The reverberating clang of those 
accusatory words would drown all weaker sounds. It is 
for ordinary minds, and not for a pyschoanalysts that 
our Rules of Evidence are framed. They have their 
source very often in considerations of administrative 
convenience, of practical expediency, and not in rules 
of logic. When the risk of confusion is so great as to 
upset the balance of advantage, the evidence goes out". 
(Cited Shepard v. United States, 290 US 96 54 Supreme 
Court 2278 at 25 LED 196, (1933). 
In the U . S . v. Brown case, the Court reversed a lower Court's 
decision, allowing evidence of the nature mentioned above, on the 
grounds that the prejudicial effect far outweighed the probative 
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value. Furthermore, the Court stated that in certain cases where 
a claim of self defense was made, the Court would need to apply 
this balancing approach to determine whether or not the evidence 
was sufficiently probative. 
This same issue has been addressed by the Utah Supreme Court 
in the case of State v. Wauneka, 560 P.2d 1377 (Utah 1977). 
Again, the Court in this case reversed a lower Court's decision 
allowing such statements into evidence and again, made the narrow 
ruling concerning the evidence in that particular case. The door 
in Wauneka is left open to possible admissibility of this type of 
statement when the Defendant pleads self defense. 
The prejudical effect of a statement is never more vividly 
evident than it is in the present case. The claim of self 
defense relied upon by the Court in this case, apparently comes 
from the statements of the Defendant during his testimony that "I 
just kept backing away from her because I was afraid" and "I 
backed up against the wall and just kind of slid down against the 
wall to my knees". (Tr. 1294) 
The Court, in the present case, would need to apply at least 
some degree of imagination to say that the above described 
statements would constitute a defense of self defense. This is 
especially evident since there is never any questions posed to 
the Defendant concerning exactly what he was afraid of. The 
evidence is unclear as to whether he was afraid he was going to 
be shot, or whether he was afraid she was going to shoot herself 
if he walked closer to her. A thorough reading of the record in 
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this portion of the transcript, would tend to lend greater 
creadance to the latter interpretation. 
Although the Court, in the present case, makes a ruling 
concerning the admissibility of this evidence, there is no record 
concerning the Court's weighing the probative value versus the 
prejudicial effect in the present case and furthermore, there is 
amply reason to believe that the prejudicial effect was 
substantial, even to the point that the jury may have been swayed 
by this alone during their lengthy five hour deliberation of the 
case. 
The Court, in Instruction #21 to the jury, made a limiting 
instruction concerning testimony regarding statements made by the 
deceased, Claudette Auble. Although technically the Instruction 
is correct, the difficulty of the individual jurors have in 
separating the purposes for which that particular testimony was 
given, is very much in doubt. This is particularly evident where 
the statement itself directly implies the guilt of the Defendant 
in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court erred in allowing testimony of John Marsh 
concerning statements made by the decedent, Claudette Auble, into 
evidence. These statements concerning her fear that the 
Defendant would kill if she were to leave him were highly 
prejudicial, went directly to the matter of guilt or innocence, 
and dispite an Instruction limiting their use, played a 
substantial role in the conviction of the Defendant in this case. 
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Where the Court failed to make a record concerning the 
admissibility of this evidence, particularly the balancing 
process between the probative value versus the prejudicial 
effect, the Defendant is entitled to a new trial in which these 
particular statements are excluded. 
The Defendant therefore, respectfully request that this 
Court reverse his conviction and remand the matter for a new 
Tr ial. 
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